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1. Introduction 
 
Recently the pricing problem of a monopolist producing several different qualities of a product 
has received some attention in the literature.  Mussa and Rosen (1978) studied the optimal 
product mix of a monopolist producing different qualities and facing consumers differentiated 
by their preference for quality, and Itoh (1983) analysed the welfare aspects of the problem.  
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980), Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gabszewicz et al  (1986) have 
examined the relation of the degree of heterogeneity among consumers, and the  number of 
firms characterising the market in equilibrium.  In this literature, product quality is exogenous.  
By contrast, situations where product quality is endogenously determined by the number of 
consumers in the market has received less attention after the early work of Levy-Lambert 
(1968) and Marchand (1968) in the theory of general equilibrium and clubs.   
 
Congestion externality however is an important feature in a wide variety of industries.  Since 
the quality of a service fast deteriorates with increase in number of customers relative to 
servicing capacity, almost all service industries, and product industries with a significant 
service component (e.g. retailing, restaurants, bars) are prone to congestion externality.  
Recently two papers by Chander and Leruth (1989) and Leruth (1993) have developed a model 
of product differentiation by congestion level in a market with heterogeneous consumers, and 
shown that with heterogeneous consumers, a monopolist finds it optimal to product 
differentiate through congestion levels.  
 
The present paper relates to the general issue of monopolist decision making under congestion 
and heterogeneous consumers, but examines a different problem.  In some industries it is 
possible for the seller to offer a product with zero congestion by means of home delivery.  
Home delivery is then used as a way of reducing congestion in the selling place thus improving 
the quality of the product sold there and increasing its demand.  At the same time it creates a 
second product with zero congestion and can mop up consumer surplus from the other, more 
congestion-conscious end of the market.  Home delivery of pizzas, for example, is not only a 
product that saves consumers’ transport cost but also serves to deliver the product without the 
congestion at the eating place or the queue for takeaway.  In a wide variety of service products 
like tutoring, hair cuts, midwifery, counselling, therapeutic massages, and so on  home delivery 
of the service is a fast growing development in many countries and they have already 
significant market shares.  
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Our paper relates to congestion-prone products where home delivery is logistically feasible.  It 
argues that in situations of service congestion where consumers are differentiated by 
congestion consciousness, there generally exists an in-store sale-cum-home delivery plan that 
is better than the profit maximising solution without differentiation.  The argument need not 
contradict the general belief that home delivery business thrives on the discount that consumers 
get on their transport cost.  It provides additional insight into home delivery service as a 
decongestant mechanism. 
 
To keep the arguments related to an example, we use a monopolist selling pizzas in a market 
where consumers have different levels of dislike for congestion at the eating parlour ( or the 
takeaway counter).  But the arguments equally apply to all commodities prone to congestion 
wherever home delivery is feasible.  To keep the model simple, we abstract from the issues 
related to location and transport cost in the following discussion. 
 
2. The Model 
 
Consider a pizza-selling monopolist facing a market with the following characteristics: 
 
1.  Perceived quality of the product deteriorates with congestion in the selling place.  It is 
represented by an index  k = k(Q) , where Q is the number of in-store buyers, k > 0 and 
k  <0.  We will use ‘congestion’ and ‘the number of in-store buyers’ synonymously, 
both denoted by Q.   Perceived quality of the product, if home delivered, is denoted by 
k(0) and k(0)> k(Q) for all Q >0.  
 
2.  Consumers are heterogeneous and derive different levels of utility from any given 
quality.  When the  i-th  consumer buys a unit of the product of quality k at price p, her 
surplus is described by: 
 
 Si  = ti . k - p        (1) 
 where  ti  >0  is a subjective index of  preference for quality. 

 Consumers are imagined as arranged in the ascending order of the value of their 
subjective index t.  The number of consumers with index t is given by a density  
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function f(t) over the domain T1  tT2.The function f(t) is integrable and 
everywhere positive.
 
4.  A consumer either buys only one unit or does not buy at all.  A unit is bought by the i-
th consumer only if Si  0
 
5.  If Q  is the number of consumers buying the product, the lowest value of t for which 
the product is bought by some consumer is denoted by t0    and is given by: 
 
 t0  . k(Q)  - p = 0       (2)  
 
 For consumers with ti < t0  , Si   is negative, and they do not buy the product.  Note 
that for a level of congestion Q , t0   is given by  
 
 t0  = p/ k(Q)        (3) 
 
6.  Marginal cost of producing pizzas and delivering them at home is fixed and zero. 
  
 
If the monopolist is offering only one product, i.e. undifferentiated by quality, at a price p, 
then profit is given by  p. Q, where Q  = , and the problem is to set p so as to 
maximise Call it Problem 1.  We propose to show that if there is an interior solution to 
this problem then the monopolist can increase profits above that solution value by introducing 
a home delivery option at an appropriate charge.  To characterise choice between in-store 
buying and home delivery we introduce the following assumption. 
f t dt
t
T
( )
0
2
 
3. An Assumption about Choice 
 
A customer buys in-store or takes home delivery depending on which mode of purchase 
yields higher consumer surplus.  Also we assume that indifference results in in-store 
purchase.  When the number of in-store consumers is Q,  a consumer with index ti  takes 
home delivery if 
 
ti . k(Q)  - p < ti . k(0) - p - D 0      (4) 
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where D is the home delivery charge. 
Writing the first inequality in (4) as an equality 
 
ti . k(Q)  - p = ti . k(0) - p - D       (5) 
 
and calling the solution for ti   as t1 , we have:  
 
t1    = D /[ k(0) - k(Q)]        (6) 
 
Thus if  the congestion is Q, for t0  ti    t1  a consumer buys in-store, while for t1  ti   
T2   a consumer opts for home delivery. 
 
4. The Theorem 
 
If Problem 1 has an interior solution, then there is an in-store sale-cum-home delivery option 
that generates a profit higher than the solution value of  Problem 1. 
 
5. Proof 
 
Let the profit maximising price for Problem 1 be p*, and the solution values of t0 ,  and Q be 
t0 *,  * and Q* respectively.  Since it is an interior solution, in view of (3), we have  
 
 0 < t0* =  p* / k(Q*) < T2             (7) 
 
and   *  = p*.        (8) f t dt
t
T
( )
*0
2
 
Imagine now that the price for in-store sale is maintained at p*, but a home delivery option is 
introduced at an  additional charge D, such that  
 
 p
k Q
D
k k Q
T*
( *) ( ) ( *)
  0 2       (9) 
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p* and D would now repartition the domain of t at some  0   = pk Q
*
( *)
and 1  = Dk k Q( ) ( *)0   
such that for0  ti    1  a consumer buys in-store, while for 1  ti   T2   a consumer 
opts for home delivery.  Condition (9) is to ensure that 0   < 1  < T2  .  
This partition however is not sustainable.  Now that some people are taking home delivery, 
congestion will be less than Q* and the values 0  and 1  will have to alter.  The equilibrium 
configuration that will emerge will feature a different congestion level as well as 
correspondingly different partition points . 
 
Denote the equilibrium partition points as t0  and t1  and the number of consumers buying in-
store by Q1  .  Then Q1   =  while the values of tf t dt
t
t
( )
0
1 0  and t1  are those obtained from (3) 
and (6) respectively by putting Q = Q1   and p = p*.  Also let the number of consumers taking 
home delivery be denoted by Q2 , so that Q2   = . f t dt
t
T
( )
1
2
 
The new profit is given by  p*  + (p*+D)  f t dt
t
t
( )
0
1 f t dt
t
T
( )
1
2
  = p* f t  + D        (10)   dt
t
T
( )
0
2 f t dt
t
T
( )
1
2
 
Given that f(t) is everywhere positive, an examination of (8) and (10) shows that a sufficient 
condition for  is that t0 *  t0 .  This can be shown to hold by contradiction. 
Suppose t0 *< t0  .  Then  > > , which implies Q* > Qf t dt
t
T
( )
*0
2 f t dt
t
T
( )
0
2 f t dt
t
t
( )
0
1 1 . 
 
In turn this implies k (Q1 ) > k (Q*), since k  <0 by assumption. 
Therefore   [p*/ k (Q*)] > [p*/ k (Q1  ) ], i.e. t0 *> t0  which is a contradiction. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
This result implies that any D consistent with (9) as home delivery charge and p* as price does 
better than the best undifferentiated price p*.  That a D consistent with (9) exists is ensured by  
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the fact that Problem 1 has an interior solution, characterised by (7).  The intuition behind the 
result is fairly simple.  If home delivery is introduced, and some consumers opt for it, it 
reduces congestion compared to the undifferentiated optimum and thus brings along additional 
consumers who were earlier deterred by congestion.  On the other side of the distribution, those 
consumers who are leaving the store, are but going to opt for home delivery and are therefore 
actually paying higher than they were earlier.  So the monopolist can not but gain by 
introducing the home delivery option.  We should however point out that (p*, D) is not 
purported to be the profit maximising solution with home delivery, which in general is 
expected to be some other vector. 
 
If  there is a positive but constant marginal cost m for unit home delivery, the proof remains the 
same, except that there should be some D consistent with (9) with the additional requirement 
that  D-m >0.  If m is too large this may not be possible.  However note that we have worked in 
terms of a sufficient condition for It is therefore possible that even if there is no D in 
(9) such that D - m >0,  may still exceed

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